Analysis: Has Caracas already reached an agreement with Washington, or is it strategically buying time?

Information that emerged this morning about an alleged agreement between Caracas and Washington looks like perfect material for a victory announcement by Donald Trump, but also like a warning of just how fragile the entire arrangement really is. Let us first look at what is being claimed. Under this agreement, the United States is expected to take between 30 and 50 million barrels of so-called sanctioned Venezuelan oil, with a total value of up to two billion dollars. The oil would be shipped directly from tankers to American ports, while Trump himself claims that the proceeds from the sale will be under his personal control, supposedly to benefit "both the citizens of Venezuela and the citizens of the United States."

The deal was preceded by an embargo on Venezuelan oil exports introduced in mid-December, which led to oil piling up on tankers and in storage facilities and forced the state company PDVSA to consider further production cuts. All of this is happening just days after U.S. forces captured Nicolas Maduro in an operation. Trump is presenting this combination of blockade, capture, and sudden reopening of the oil valve as proof that his threat of military intervention has borne fruit, and that interim president Delcy Rodriguez is now, under pressure, doing what Washington demands.

At first glance, it all looks like a swift triumph of American power. Oil that in recent years had been flowing toward China is now allegedly heading to refineries in the southern United States, while U.S. energy and interior officials are appearing in the media with optimistic messages about jobs, lower fuel prices, and the possibility of Venezuela being "transformed" with the help of American capital. Chevron, which even during the blockade remained the only significant channel through which Venezuelan oil reached the United States, is effectively receiving confirmation of its privileged role. In energy markets and among part of the American public, the impression is being created that Trump has succeeded where his predecessors only issued threats: controlling the key resource of a "problem state in America’s backyard" without a full-scale war.

However, when the news is read more closely, it becomes clear that behind the claims lies what is essentially the forced monetization of seized assets, not any real consolidation of control over Venezuela. The key sentence is that, for now, it is unclear whether Venezuela will have any access at all to the revenue from these shipments, while Trump openly emphasizes that the money will be under his supervision. This means that Caracas is, at this moment, effectively handing over oil without any clear mechanism for recovering its value, which from the standpoint of sovereignty is deeply humiliating, and from the standpoint of the "agreement’s" sustainability, highly risky. If the government in Caracas bears political responsibility for exporting the oil but has no control over the revenue, then this amounts to an illegal seizure under threat of force.

For the entire Chavista leadership, the message is extremely bleak. Despite years of sanctions and pressure, Maduro was still a symbol of the guarantee that total capitulation was not the only way out. His violent removal, followed by an agreement that looks like the forced redirection of oil without any benefit for Venezuela — apart from bare survival — sends a signal that even swift cooperation by the new interim president Rodriguez guarantees no security at all. Many of these people are already under personal sanctions, have frozen assets, and face restrictions on their movement. In such an atmosphere, completely abandoning Russia, China, and Iran would be not only politically suicidal but also strategically irrational, since these very actors have in recent years served as economic and diplomatic insurance against American arbitrariness.

The idea that the so-called old structure is America’s best bet for controlling Venezuela does not really mean that the Chavistas have been bought or transformed into obedient clients. Rather, it means that Washington has calculated that it is easier to push oil toward the market through existing state institutions than through the chaos of regime change. In that sense, Delcy Rodriguez now becomes a kind of reluctant administrator of a crisis arrangement. She must keep the state apparatus alive, avoid further escalation of the kind Trump is threatening, show at least a minimal willingness to cooperate, and at the same time preserve some semblance of sovereignty so that her own base does not see her as a mere appointee of Washington. In practice, that means "procedural obedience" — or, put differently, buying time.

The economic backdrop makes this balancing act even more delicate. Venezuela is emerging from a period of near-total collapse, but in recent years there have been signs of recovery — largely orchestrated by Rodriguez herself — including partial dollarization, a modest increase in production, and a more flexible relationship between the state and the market. The export blockade introduced in mid-December threatened precisely this fragile stabilization, because overflowing tankers and storage facilities are forcing PDVSA to cut production further. Once certain fields and wells are shut down, returning them to previous output levels is often expensive and slow, and sometimes even impossible. Under such circumstances, accepting a humiliating arrangement with Washington may look to Caracas like a necessary evil: a short-term escape from deeper economic suffocation, even though everyone knows that the long-term price of such consent is paid in lost autonomy.

On the other side, Trump too is operating within serious constraints, no matter how absolutist his public appearances may sound. The United States does not have any realistic ability to send hundreds of thousands of troops into Venezuela and maintain long-term control over a territory that is geographically difficult, politically polarized, and historically prone to prolonged resistance against foreign armies. The American public is weary of large military adventures, allies are not enthusiastic about the idea of an openly colonial war in Latin America’s backyard, and any wider expansion of the conflict would create space precisely for the powers Washington wants to push out. For that reason, the arsenal available to Trump is limited to a combination of sanctions, blockades, special operations, and legal pressure — tools that can break an economy and topple individual leaders, but cannot automatically create a long-term stable and loyal order.

In this picture, China, Russia, and Iran do not disappear; they merely retreat temporarily into the background. China will coolly register that part of the oil intended for it has been redirected under American supervision, but it will also retain leverage in its other dealings with Caracas. Russia will continue offering political support and safe channels for certain people within the government. Iran will remain important as a source of experience in bypassing embargoes and surviving under pressure. All of this means that even if Caracas tactically yields today, tomorrow it will still have someone to turn to when it begins looking for ways to reduce its dependence on Washington.

The most likely outcome is not a quick American victory, but a prolonged, tense equilibrium in which part of Venezuela’s oil really does flow toward the United States under terms defined by Washington, while Caracas simultaneously tries to rebuild ties — even if quietly — with other buyers and financiers. Trump will be able for some time to claim that he controls Venezuelan oil, but behind that image will remain the fact that he has no real control over Venezuelan politics, society, or long-term strategic orientation. Venezuela will formally remain semi-sovereign, but with seriously limited room for maneuver, forced to balance between immediate economic survival and a long struggle for at least partial freedom of action. In that sense, today’s agreement looks more like the beginning of a frozen crisis than a final solution, and the speed with which triumph has been declared may, over time, prove to be the first sign of a future backlash.

For now, we can conclude that the situation is still very fresh. Can Rodriguez even survive in her position? What is the final position of Russia and China beyond the lukewarm and procedural statements so far about the violation of Venezuelan sovereignty? Who exactly within the existing power system betrayed Maduro? Only once we get more concrete answers to these questions will it become clearer where this deep crisis is heading. What can be "heard" from circles that have closely and long followed Venezuela’s internal situation is that Delcy is a "Chavista" — something also claimed by the well-known geopolitical analyst Pepe Escobar, who is very familiar with the chronology of the Venezuelan situation. He is not the only one. Many have been asked the question, "Did Rodriguez betray Maduro?" and most claim that this is not the case. Those who are skeptical, for now, have no concrete evidence. In the meantime, all kinds of things are being mentioned, from negotiations in Qatar to claims that "Trump and Putin made a deal" along the lines of "Ukraine for you, Venezuela for me," but for now these are only speculations. It has been only four days since the dramatic abduction; things will only become clearer from here, and we probably will not have to wait long.